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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD J. YOUNG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

JULIA M. BARNEY and UTAH
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

10519

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Appellant is appealing from the Order of the
trial court granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss as
to the defendant, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and this motion was granted by the trial
1

court as to the defendant insurance company. The ;
court also denied plaintiff's motion for production of '
the policy of insurance upon which the amended complaint was based.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit that the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah should affirm the order of the
trial court in dismissing the amended complaint, denying the plaintiff's motion for production of an alleged
insurance policy and denying the plaintiff's demand
for answers to interrogatories.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents agree
as set forth in appellant's
respondents do not admit
ported allegations referred
and statement of facts.

with the statement of facts
brief, but in doing so the
the unproved and unsupto in appellant's pleadings

POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING AND STRIKING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The lower court in dismissing the appellant's
attempted joinder of the insurance carrier and in denying discovery of the alleged insurance policy sets forth
2

the basis of such action in a memorandum decision
(R34). In paragraph 4 of the memorandum decision
the lower court said :
"All of the above matters which are noted as
requiring striking of them are entirely immaterial and irrelevant in this action." (R34).
Finding the same to be immaterial and irrelevant the
lower court accordingly ordered the amended complaint
stricken and dismissed ( R35) .
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower court
is correct and is supported by both logic and law.

The appellant in support of his appeal relies on
Rules 18 (a), 18 ( b) and 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 18 (a) first permits the joinder either
as independent or as alternate claims as many claims
as one may have against an opposing party. The Rule
then provides for a like joinder of claims where there
are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19,
20 and 22 are satisfied. Rule 18 thus concerns itself
only with various claims which may have arisen against
the same party and permits joinder of various claims
against various defendants only if Rules 19, 20 and
22 are satisfied.
It is obvious that the requirements of Rules 19
and 22 have not been satisfied and the appellant does
not contend that they have. The appellant suggests
that he has satisfied the requirements of Rule 20 and
relies on that Rule. This Rule provides for joinder
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of a person where the claims against such person have
arisen out of the same transaction of occurrence or
series of transactions or occurrences from which plaintiff's claim against the other parties arose and if any
question of law of fact common to all parties defendant
will arise in the action. Clearly defendant Barney's
act of obtaining insurance coverage did not arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence upon which plaintiff's negligence action against Barney is based and
certainly there is no common question of law or fact
connecting the two separate acts.
The material found in Section 10 of an annotation
reported in 61 A.L.R. 2d 688 is instructive:
""Thile some federal cases express the view
that Federal Rule 18 (b) permits the joinder of
a claim against a tortfeasor and a claim against
his liability insurer, no case actually so holding
has been found. "\Vhere not specifically permitted
by other provisions of the law, such j oinder has
been held improper for various reasons. Some
cases proceed on the theory that Rule 18 (b) is
not applicable where the joinder is against the
law or public policy of the state in which the
federal court is siting. Other cases reach the same
result without any reference to Federal Rule
18(b)."
It is submitted that the substantive law is well
settled conclusively against the appellant and that the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not abridge, enlarge
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 78·
2-4 U.C.A., provides as follows:

4

1

"The Supreme Court of the state of Utah has
power to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for
all courts of the state of Utah, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions and the practice and procedure in all civil and criminal actions and proceedings, including rules of evidence therein, and also divorce, probate and
guardianship proceedings. Such rules may not
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights
of any litigant."
The Supreme Court of Utah has previously spoken
on the subject of joinder in the case of UTAH F ARl\l
BUREAU INS. CO. v. CHUGG, 6 Utah 2d 399,
315 P. 2d 277 ( 1957) . The court said:
" ... Had Larson objected to his joinder in
this action, which he did not do, nor did he appear in this court to voice such objection, it
would have been error to have compelled his
joinder even under a most liberal view of Rule
20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and we want
to repel any inference which may be drawn from
this opinion that one who claims to be damaged
by the negligent act of another, is a proper party
to an action by the insurer of the latter under
a public liability policy, whereby a declaratory
judgment is sought declaring th~ legal effect of
the terms of such policy.
The "transaction" involved in this action is
one between the insurer and insured, namely
their contract. Such contract can be construed
without reference to any liability having accrued
thereunder. This being so, there is no issue of
law or fact in common between the insurer and
the plaintiff, or potential plaintiff, to a tort action against the insured. The tort victim has
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no present legal interest in the insurance contract. To drag him into the declaratory judgment action is to import into it a totally different controversy, and then assert that there are
issues of law or fact in common. Indeed, if such
tort victim is a proper party to the present action,
then it would appear that the insurance company, and other companies similarly situated,
is a proper party to a tort action against the
insured-a proposition which, it is safe to assume, such companies would not espouse."
An annotation found in 7 A.L.R. 1003 sets forth
the general rule as follows:
"It seems to be clear that in the absence of
permissive statutory provision a cause of action
for personal injuries negligently inflicted cannot
be jqined with a cause of action against an indemnity company on a contract of insurance."

The general rule is also stated in 7 Am. J ur. 2d
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, Section 210, which
states:
"As a general rule, and in the absence of a
contractual or statutory provision in such re·
spect, there is no privity between an injured person and a liability insurer, and the former has
no right of ~ction at law against the latter. It
follows, therefore, that the injured person in
such ca~e cannot join the insured and the lia·
bility insurer as parties defendant."
See also 29(a) Am. Jur. 2d INSURANCE, Section
1485.
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lt is apparent from the material cited that Utah
has adopted the general rule. The only jurisdiction
holding to the contrary seem to be where there has
been a statutory change of the common law.
Utah has long recognized the inherent mischief
of introducing the fact of the existence or non-existence
of insurance coverage. In a long line of cases from the
Supreme Court of Utah it has been stated and restated that insurance coverage is immaterial and irrelevant to the issues of liability and damage and that to
introduce such fact to the jurors would tend to prejudice one of the parties. If the knowledge of insurance
is irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial, then the
joinder of an insurance carrier as a party defendant
would be even more so.
In the case of BALLE v. SMITH, 81 Utah 179,
17 P. 2d 224 ( 1932), the court said:
"The universal rule is that it is irrelevant to
the issue of negligence whether the defendant is
carrying liability insurance or not, and, subject
to some qualificatons which need not be here
mentioned, such testimony is wholly inadmissible.
Courts have guarded jealously against the introduction of such evidence before the jury, not
only because it is irrelevant to the issue, but because jurors are commonly thought to be prejudiced against insurance companies, and, if the
fact were known that the defendant is insured,
jurors would be less inclined to consider the case
on the merits, and more inclined to render a
verdict for plaintiff and in a larger amount than
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if the defendant, especially where the defendant
is an individual, had to bear the loss alone ... "
In the case of SALTAS v. AFFLECK, 99 Utah
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940), the court said:
" ... Neither this court nor the trial court is
concerned about the question as to whether a
defendant carries insurance. Nor should the jury
be so concerned. The cases indicate that this
question, which should not be and is not a matter
of concern, is often injected in indirect ways
upon this matter of insurance giving rise to many
cases . . . "
In the case of MORRISON v. PERRY, 104
Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943), the court said:
"It is apparent the only purpose for such per·
sistent question was to tell the jury that defend·
ant was insured. From the record it appears that
plaintiff's counsel knew that Mr. Williams was
employed by the insurance company and conse·
quently he could anticipate the witness' answer.
e need not cite authority for the 1'toposition
that the question of indemnity insurance in a
case such as this is irrelevant. It is also a well·
known fact that juries are influenced in deter·
mining liability and the amount of recovery by
the fact that an insurance company would pay
the damages."

'¥

In the case of IVIE v. RICHARDSON, 9 Utah
2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 ( 1959), the court held that plain·
tiff's counsel conducted himself improperly in examin·
ing a witness for the "thinly veiled design of getting
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the fact of insurance before the jury".
In the case of HILL v. CONRAD, H Utah :Zd
55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the court said:

"It seems hardly necessary to state that the
matter of insurance is quite immaterial to issues
as to liability and damages, or the amount thereof. It is also true that inasmuch as the defendant
is entitled to have this extraneous matter excluded from the case, the plaintiff is entitled to
the same protection if he so desires. If the defendant were allowed to sh9w non-insurance,
and the plaintiff allowed to rebut it, the mischief
which could develop from preoccupation with the
immaterial issue is obvious. In the instant situation candor requires recognition that it was
improper for the defendant to inject the matter
of insurance into the case."

In the case of ROBINSON v. HREINSON, 17
Utah 2d 261, 409 P. 2d 121 (1965), the court said:
"'Ve do not depart from our former position:
that the question of insurance_ ~s immaterial and
should not be injected into the trial; and that it
is the duty of both counsel and the court to guard
against it."
The joinder of the insurance earner as a party
defendant serves no useful purpose. The right of the
injured to collect from the insurance carrier of the
insured without the joinder of the insurance carrier as
a party defendant is not in question. The duty of the
insurance carrier to satisfy the judgment taken against
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the insured is clear and is required by the statutes of
Utah, 41-12-21, Utah Code Annot ated, 1953.
The appellant complains that a plaintiff is prejudiced by keeping defendant's insurance coverage from
the knowledge of the jury and that by doing so an
attempt is made to create the impression that the "defendant is one that will be liable to pay the judgment
and will be the victim of a judgment large or small."
The appellant argues, in effect, that it would be better
to prejudice the defendant and his insurance carrier
by letting the jury know that any judgment granted
will be satisfied from the supposedly deep pocket of
the insurer. This suggestion of the appellant is not
only illogical but it overlooks the well-established law
to the contrary.
The appellant in his brief makes some note of the
typical "no action clause" and then asks the court to
distinguish this case from the general and prevailing
rule that where a policy contains such a provision that
an action cannot be brought in the first instance against
the insurer until the determination of the liability has
been made. It is respectfully submitted that this queition is not before the court and that the court cannot
intelligently deal with this question since the insurance
policy and its "no action clause" is not a part of the
record. Evei:i if it were, the general rule is contrary
to the position urged by the appellant. The rule is
stated in 159 A.L.R. 763, as follows:
"The validity of a clause in a casualty insur·
10

ance policy providing that no action shall be
instituted against the insurer until the liability
of the insured shall have been determined by a
final judgment or by agreement of the parties
has generally been sustained."
The suggestoin of the appellant that this case is
distinguishable because the defendant insurance company was not brought in until it had taken over the
defense of the case seems to this writer to be without
merit. The substantive law can't be avoided or changed
by merely filing an amended complaint and joining
the insurance carrier after the carrier, in accordance
with the terms of the insurance contract, undertakes
the defense of the insured.
The appellant urges this court to recognize that
a party under a contract made for his benefit may sue
on the contract without having been a party to the
contract. Respondents admit this to be a correct statement of the law but note that an insurance contract is
not a third party beneficiary contract but an indemnity contract running to the insured and insuring him
against liability.
Stripped of all sham, the plaintiff's only purpose
in the joining of the insurance carrier is to expose to
the jury the insurance policy which is an asset of the
defendant. If this asset is to be exposed, then why
not the other assets of the defendant, and if the defendant's assets are exposed he would certainly have
the right to introduce evidence of his liabilities-his
11

notes and payables due and to become due, his tax '
liabilities, his duties to educate and provide for hi~
minor children and his aged parents, the alimony he
must pay to his ex-wife, prior judgments against him
-the possibilities are endless. Perhaps the loss ratio
of the insurance carrier and a discussion of insurance
rates by an actuary would become material. If the
financial condition of the defendant and his insurance
carrier is material, then why not the financial condition
of the plaintiff?
Let us suppose that the defendant had no insurance
policy and no other assets. Would the appellant be
happy to have these facts exposed to the jm·y? Would
such an exposure be any aid to a jury in determining
the liability of the defendant or the damages suffered
by the plaintiff? If the existence of an insurance policy
is exposed by permitting the j oinder of the insurance
carrier as a party defendant, the Box of Pandora
will have been opened.
It seems to the writer of this brief that the exist·
ence or nonexistence of insurance coverage would be
no more extraneous to the issues of liability and damage
than the defendant's preference in girls, ice cream,
sports and r:eligion. To introduce such a concept into
a negligence trial before a jury would be to place the
jury in the untenable position of attempting to appor·
tion a defendant's estate and the assets of the insurance
company among the competing claims made upon those
assets.
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The law has long recognized that neither the defendant's liability nor the plaintiff's damages can be
predicated upon the defendant's ability to satisfy a
judgment granted against him. There appears to be
no valid, logical or lawful reason why this should now
be done. The only reason submitted by the appellant
is that he would like to have the jury prejudiced in
his favor, and prejudice it would be, since such knowledge fails to illuminate the two issues to be decided
by the jury: the issue of the defendant's ability and
the issue of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
It is respectfully submitted that appellant has
failed to cite one authority supporting the position
he urges upon the court. It must be admitted, however,
that appellant's candor in urging this court to change
the law because of some imagined prejudice is refreshing. It is submitted, notwithstanding such refreshing
candor, that the present law is premised upon logic
and sound reason and that to adopt the appellant's
position would create problems far greater than the
imagined problem the appellant seeks so valiantly to
cure.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PRODUCTION OF AN ALLEGED INSURANCE POLICY NOR IN DENYING AP13

PELLANT'S DEJVIAND FOR ANS\VERS TO
INTERROGATORIES.
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for the production of documents which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26 (b). Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provide as follows:
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30 ( b) or ( d), the deponent may
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the examining party,
or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documnts, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts. It is not ground for objection
that the testimony will be inadmissible at the
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
It is submitted that the insurance policy is not
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action and that it will not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Under the rules the insurance policy
is clearly not subject to discovery since it is not relevant
and since it will not lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
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The Idaho Supreme Court, in the recent case of
SANDERS v. AYRHART, 404 P. 2d 589 (1965),
in sustaining the defendant's refusal to answer oral
interrogatories concerning his insurance coverage,
adopted the language used in the case of JEPPSON
v. SWANSON, 68 N:\V. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955), m
which the court states:
"It would seem to us that, even though the
discovery is not to be limited to facts which may
be admissible as evidence the ultimate goal is
to ascertain facts or information which may be
used for proof or defense of an action. Such information may be discovered by leads from other
discoverable information. The purpose of the
discovery rules is to take the surprise out of
trials of cases, so that all relevant facts and information pertaining to the action may be ascertained in advance of trial. Where it is sought to
discover information which can have no possible
bearing on the determination of the action on its
merits, it can hardly be within the rule. It is not
intended to supply information for the personal
use of a litigant that has no connection with the
determination of the issues involved in the action
on their merits. BALAZS v. ANDERSON,
D.C.N.D. Ohio, 77 F. Supp. 612, 68 N.W. 2d
at P. 656.

"Under the guise of liberal construction, we
should not emasculate the rules by permitting
something which never was intended or is not
within the declared objects for which they were
adopted. Neither should expedience or the desire
to dispose of lawsuits without trial, however desirable that may be from the standpoint of reliev-
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ing congested calendars, be permitted to cause
us to lose sight of the limitations of the discovery
rules or the boundaries beyond which we should
not go. If, perchance we have the power under
the ~nabling act to extend the discovery rules
to permit discovery of information desired for
the sole purpose of encouraging or assisting in
negotiations for settlement of tort claims, it
woudl be far better to amend the rules so as to
state what may and what may not be done in
that field than to stretch the present discovery
rules so as to accomplish something which the
language of the rules does not permit." ( 404
P. 2d 592).
The great majority of the State Courts have refused to require defendants to reveal the information
as to defendant's liability insurance coverage.< 1 >
There has been briefed and argued to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah and there is now pending
before the court in the case of PHILLIP E. ELLIS
and CAROLYN B. ELLIS, Plaintiffs and Respondents, vs. MRS. BETTY GILBERT, Defendant and
1 Arizona, DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 327 P.2d 746
(1958); Connecticut, Verrastro v. Grecco, 149 A.2d 703 (1958);
Delaware, Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514; Florida, Brooks v.
Owens, 97 So.2d 693; Georgia, Patillo v. Thompson, 128 S.E.2d
656; Idaho, Sanders v. Ayrhart, 404 P.2d 589 ( 1965); Minnesota, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Missouri,
State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (does allow name
of company, but not terms of contract); Montana, State ex rel.
Hersman v. District Court of Sixth Judicial District, 381 P.2d
799 (1963); Nebraska, Mecke v. Bahr, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964);
Nevada, State ex rel. Allen v. Second Judicial District Court,
245 P.2d 999 (1952); New Hampshire, Hardware Mutual Casualty Company v. Hopkins, 196 A.2d 66 (1963) (allowed inspection of policies but amounts of insurance coverage not
required to be disclosed); New Jersey, Goheen v. Goheen, 154
A.393 (1931); Oklahoma, Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (1957);
South Dakota, Bean v. Best, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
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1

Appellant, Case No. 10526, the question as to the discovery of an insurance policy. It is anticipated that
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah will hand down
its decision in the above cited case prior to any decision
in this matter and that the law with reference to this
matter will thereby be settled and the parties to this
matter will be bound by the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case referred to.
The respondents by this reference adopt the appellants' brief in the case referred to and respectfully
submit that the law is clear and that the Rules do not
provide for the production of the insurance policy
and that the policy is not subject to discovery.

POINT III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE PLAINTIF'F ARE NOT VIOLATED BY
THE PLAINTIFF'S INABILITY TO JOIN
THE INSURANCE CARRIER AS A PARTY
DEFENDANT.
The insurance contract runs to the insured and is
an asset purchased and paid for by the insured to
indemnify him against liability-for his own protection
and not for the protection of anyone he may injure.
The insured is the real party in interest and the appellant's argument that his constitutional rights can only
17

be secured by permitting the joinder of the insurance
carrier as a party defendant is novel and seems to the
writer of this brief to be without merit. The plaintiff
has not been, and is not being denied his day in court.
If he establishes the respondents' liability and appellant's damages, then the insurance carrier is required
under law to respond in accordance with the terms of
the insurance contract. The appellant can and will have
a fair and impartial trial without the joinder of the
insurance company as a party defendant.
It seems to this writer that the appellant takes
an inconsistent position. On the one hand, appellant
wants the respondents to be bound strictly by the
terms of the insurance contract so that any judgment
taken against the insured will be paid by the insurer.
On the other hand, appellant wants to disregard the
terms of the insurance contract and proceed directly
against the insurer.

The appellant suggests that the plaintiff is at a
disadvantage because he is opposed "by an insurance
company with all its resources." We suggest that the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah will take judicial
notice that the plaintiff is represenetd by reputable,
competent, knowledgeable and resourceful counsel and
that the plaintiff in this respect has resources equal to
those of the insurance company.
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff will
not be deprived of any of his constitutional rights by
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denying him the right to join the insurance carrier as
a party defendant. It is also suggested that to join
the insurance carrier as a party defendant, in violation
of the existing law and in violation of the insurance
contract itself, would be to abrogate the constitutional
rights of the insurance carrier.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
of the lower court in granting the respondent's Motion
to Dismiss as to the insurance company defendant;
in denying the production of the insurance policy and
in refusing to order the respondents to answer interrogatories and demands for admissions concerning the
insurance coverage should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES P. COWLEY
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON
& WATKISS
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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